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I Introduction
Although most of the literature on macroeconomic policy design has pr
focused on policy questions in the single open economy, there is an US
important strand that is concerned with the issues raised by interdependence Ufl
between economies. (See, for example, Hamada and Sakurai (1978), SY
Hamada (1979), Canzoneri and Gray (1983), Cooper (1983), Corden III
(1983), Miller and Salmon (1983, 1984), Sachs (1983), and Turner (1983, a
1984).) This literature emphasises the game-theoretic, strategic aspect of tin
policy-making in the international arena, and the prospects that nOn-
cooperative forms of policy, arising from the elements of externality in the de
effects of policy internationally, may lead to outcomes markedly inferior de
to those of cooperative policies. tal
As Corden (1983) notes, analytical tractability has limited this analysis
to static models, or to dynamic models with rather rudimentary dynamics, de,
or to neglect of the longer run dynamics by focusing only on short run wF
outcomes. In view of the complexities of the interactions between countries, pr
whether through prices, real demands, asset prices or the flow of funds,
aclear limitation. In this paper, we seek to
. Se
overcome it by examining policy interactions and interdependence in a.
stochastic rational expectations model with developed dynamics within a of
framework that considers both the short and longer run effects of policy. bu4
In the arena of policy debate, there has been evident the objective of
formulating policy in terms of simple rules. Thus we may cite the advocacy re
of monetary or nominal income targeting as a major plank of policy, or
the more recent advocacy of particular forms of decoupled control both IIXF
for the single open economy (see Vines et a!. (1983)) and for coping with pri
problems of interdependence (see Meade (1983)). The arguments for ofd
simplicity include the perceived advantages in providing an anchor for by
nominal variables, the gains in understanding derived from stating policy COfl
the
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in simple terms, as well as propositions about the relative information
advantage in certain variables. (For further discussion, see Currie and
Levine (1984).) In the international sphere, such simple rules for the
conduct of policy may act to constrain the options for noncooperative
behaviour whilst remaining within the agreed rules of the game. Underlying
this argument is the notion that it may be easier to secure international
agreement on the qualitative aspects of the ground rules for the conduct
of policy rather than the quantitative aspects, except within broad ranges.
Simple rules, by constraining the range of policy options, may serve to
constrain the degree of noncooperative behaviour.
Section II establishes a control theory framework to assist in addressing
these questions. Our analysis is conducted throughout in a stochastic
context. We also assume rational or consistent expectations, so that the
private sector makes no systematic errors in prediction. This provides a
useful test-bed for policy regimes, since a policy which performs badly
• under consistent expectations could perform well only by virtue of
systematic forecasting error by the private sector, and this provides an
ill-founded and inherently unstable basis for policy. We therefore set out
a procedure for deriving optimal linear time-invariant feedback rules in
linear stochastic rational expectations models, with the form of the
feedback rule constrained as appropriate. This permits, for example, the
design of optimal indicator regimes or optimal decou.pled systems. We also
derive the full optimal rule, noting the rather complex form that this rule
takes. To permit analysis of noncooperative game behaviour, we show, for
is simple rules, how the Nash equilibrium in a two-country game can be
derived as the outcome of a Cournot-type adjustment behaviour. However,
when extended to the two countries pursuing the full optimal rule this
process leads to an ever-expanding state vector, which may provide
an additional rationale for simple rules. These procedures are used in
Section VI.
a In Section III we set up a dynamic stochastic rational expectations model
a of the open economy with a developed wage/price spiral, a government
budget constraint and asset accumulation, and exchange rate dynamics
under a floating exchange rate regime. In the context of this model, we
review a variety of simple rules for the conduct of monetary and fiscal
policy in the single open economy. These include the use of various
indicators (the money supply, the exchange rate, nominal income and the
price level) for the adjustment of interest rates. They also include a variety
of decoupled rules for monetary and fiscal policy, including those advocated
by Meade (Meade (1983), Vines eta!.(1983)).Of the simple rules
considered, the price rule dominates the others. Thus it performs well in
the face of a variety of disturbances, and in this sense provides 'a horsea
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for all courses', in contrast to the other simple rules. Moreover, its superior
performance continues to hold up in the face of wide parameter variation.
Si
Relative to full optimal monetary policy, its performance is good, so that
the costs of simplicity for this rule are not high. Its performance relative
to full optimal monetary and fiscal policy is not so good, but nonetheless I,
for a simple rule it performs rather well. The form of the full optimal
ai feedback rule suggests that some extra refinements, adding, in particular,
an element of integral control, may well improve its performance further.
Thus our methods of policy design for the single open economy suggest
in
that the choice lies between two types of policy: full optimal policy, which in is rather complicated to specify and implement, but yields the best is
performance (by definition); and a form of simple price rule, which is much
simpler to specify and implement, but at the cost of some (though not
excessive) loss in performance. These results are arrived at by means of
methods of policy evaluation that, although non-standard in their use of to
stochastic control under rational expectations, are typical in their focus (s
on the single economy and their consequent neglect of issues of interde-
01
pendence. They are therefore of a kind that might be derived from a
macroeconometric model of the single open economy which properly
models expectations. The focus of the policy analysis is in the remaining
section of the paper, where we examine cooperative policy design and
compare it with design in the single open economy. In Section VI, we to
examine policy design in an interdependent world of two identical
economies. It is shown that the problem of policy design decomposes into
two orthogonal problems, the aggregate problem (which applies equally 11
to a world of many identical economies) and the divergence problem.
Optimal cooperative policy is bound to involve rather more fiscal activism m
and less active use of interest rate policy than for the single open economy
policy design. Furthermore, the simple monetary rule for interest rates
outperforms the nominal income rule, and this in turn outperforms the
price rule, which gives no gain from control. This reverses the ranking of
these policies when evaluated for the single open economy. wF
Of equal interest is the global performance of rules designed for the single is
open economy. Both the monetary and the nominal income rule perform t)
tolerablywhen evaluated in this different context. By contrast, the price T,
ruleformulated for the single open economy results in total global re.4
destabilisation if implemented generally; this appears to be because it
relies for its effects on the link between the exchange rate and the domestic w11
price level. Since this cannot operate in the aggregate, it triggers an v
over-reaction of interest rates to inflationary pressures and consequently eq
leads to instability. In this sense, it is a beggar-my-neighbour policy. TheInterdependent macroeconomic policy 231
fulloptimal rule designed for the single open economy also relies
Dr significantly on the exchange rate influence on prices, and therefore shares
in its beggar-my-neighbour consequences.
at These results highlight the externalities inherent in macroeconomic
ye policy design in an interdependent world. They suggest that there may be
ss an incentive for single countries to renege on the optimal cooperative policy
al and adopt free-riding forms of policy. To shed further light on this issue,
we report in Section VI the results of Nash games played between two
countries with different constraining ground-rules. These confirm that the
incentives to renege on the best cooperative design of monetary or nominal
ch income rules, whilst remaining within the overall constraint of such rules,
is not strong. By contrast, there is a strong incentive to renege on the
ch cooperative price rule (which amounts to minimal control), particularly
•tot since the country which reneges first retains an advantage even in the long
of run. Moreover, the threat to retaliate in kind is not credible since it leads
of to total destabilisation of the system. Clearly the price rule, and other rules
•:us (such as the full optimal rule) which rely on the exchange rate influence
de- on domestic prices are inimical to international cooperation.
Ia This analysis highlights the importance of analysing policy in an
-ny interdependent, rather than a single country, framework. It also leads to
•(ng the issue of systems of penalties to sustain cooperative solutions to the
nd policy problem. We offer some thoughts on that question in the conclusions
we to this paper.
cal
H The solution procedure





he • Ldxej LXJ
of
where z(t)isan (n—rn)x Ivector of variables predetermined at time z, x(t)
gle is anm x 1 vector of non-predetermined or 'free' variables, dxe =
fiTI 1)—x(t)where xe(t, r) denotes the expectation of x(t) formed at time
ice r, w(t) is an r x 1 vector of instruments, A and B are n x n and n x r matrices
bal respectively with time-invariant coefficients and dv is an n x Ivector of
tt white noise disturbances independently distributed with coy (dv) =Edt
tlC where E is a positive definite matrix with time-invariant coefficients.
an Variables z,xand w are all measured as deviations about the long-run
LtIY equilibrium.
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whereD is an r x n matrix with time-invariant coefficients which minimises 0
theasymptotic quadratic loss function, asy E( W), where
W=[zTxT]Q[z]+wTRw (11.3)
and QandR are n x n and r x r time-invariant positive definite matrices
respectively. By appropriate restrictions on the coefficients of D, (11.2) can m
represent a simple feedback rule on only some variables of the system. Such
simple rules can include indicator and intermediate target regimes and
decoupled rules of the kind advocated by Meade (see Vines, Maciejowski exi
and Meade (1983)).
Our solution procedure may be sketched as follows. We first solve the
model for a given feedback rule D, which is assumed to be known by evli
economic agents along with the model and the current state vector. The
solution yields the asymptotic variances and covariances of all endogenous thd
variables, and hence permits us to evaluate the loss function. We can then
implement an iterative search procedure in which the unconstrained
elements of D are varied so as to minimise the loss function.
This procedure yields optimal simple linear time-invariant feedback ml
rules. That policy should be expressible in this form is restrictive for two rul
reasons. First, as we indicate in the following, the full optimal policy cannot
be implemented in the form of a linear time-invariant feedback rule of the
form of (11.2), so that to insist on policy formulated in this form is
restrictive. (This is an important difference between control of models with, in
and those without, free variables. However, as indicated in Section 11.2,
the optimal rule can be implemented by means of linear feedback on the
zvector,together with integral control terms involving z.)Second,
restrictions on the coefficients of the D matrix,such as the zero restrictions
that arise naturally from indicator regimes or decoupled control, limit
policy design further.
It is helpful to be able to assess the costs of these restrictions on policy
design. For if the costs are not high, the benefits of design simplicity
discussed in the introduction to this paper may make simple policy its1
desirable. This requires some benchmark against which the performance
of simple rules can be judged. The obvious benchmark is that of the
performance of the full optimal rule. B
The full optimal rule is particularly useful as a benchmark since it has
the important property of certainty equivalence. This means that the closed libInterdependent macroeconomic policy 233
loop feedback solution to the deterministic and stochastic control problems
are of the same form, so that the solution to the stochastic problem is
independent of the disturbance covariance matrix, 2. Use of the full
optimal rule means that policy makers need not assess the combination
of shocks likely to perturb the system. In this sense, the full optimal rule
provides 'a horse for all courses'.
By contrast, linear time-invariant feedback rules of the form (11.2) do
3) not satisfy certainty equivalence. This is because the optimal choice of the
parameters of Ddependson the disturbance covariance matrix, I. This
es is a major disadvantage of simplicity in policy design, for policy makers
may have no reasonable estimate of I. It is not helpful to policy makers
to have a 'horse for each course' if the actual course is not known.
However, the lack of certainty equivalence does not rule out the
ki existence of simple rules that are robust in the sense of performing
reasonably well whatever the disturbance covariance matrix,(We here
he judge performance relative to that of the full optimal rule.) In our design
evaluation of Section IV we pay particular attcntion to whether robust
•he rules of this kind exist. Of course, robustness with respect to changes in
us the parameters of the disturbance covariance matrix is merely one aspect
en of the broader question of robustness with respect to other model
•ed parameter and specification changes, which we also consider.
Before turning to the detailed derivation of our control methods, we
must briefly consider the issue of time-inconsistency: Both the full optimal
vo rule and the linear time-invariant rules considered here are time-inconsis-
ot tent, because they offer to policy makers a short term incentive to renege
he on the rule which the private sector have assumed in formulating their
is plans. However, reneging imposes longer run costs by undermining faith
h, in the ability of governments to keep to commitments. If such faith is
2, undermined altogether, the result is likely to be a closed-loop Nash
equilibrium. This may be arrived at by means of a type of Cournot
d, adjustment process, with each side determining its decision sequentially on
IS the assumption of a given feedback rule on the part of the other.'
ut Alternatively, it may come about by the private sector assuming that the
government will renege if there is any short run incentive to do so,
calculating the government's optimal action accordingly, and then deter-
ty mining its optimal plan in the light of this; the government then determines
its optimal plan subject to this procedure for private sector decision
Ce making. This equilibrium is time consistent, and is necessarily inferior to
the time inconsistent full optimal policy considered in this paper. (See
Buiter (1983).)
as If the closed-loop Nash equilibrium is markedly inferior to the equi-
librium under time-inconsistent optimal policy, whether full or simple, this
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provides a strong incentive for a far-sighted government not to succumb r x-
tothe temptation of reneging. Our earlier analysis (Levine and Currie va
(1983)) suggests this to be the case, at least for certain simple models. It
also shows that well-designed simple rules may perform significantly better
than the closed-loop Nash equilibrium, so that a similar point applies to
this class of rules. This does not, of course, mean that a more myopic
government will not renege, but it does suggest that the problems of
time-inconsistent policies need not be over-stressed.2 B2
We now consider in turn the detailed derivation of optimal simple rules
and the full optimal rule, together with the two-player games.
11.1Optimalsimple rule
The first step of the solution procedure is to obtain the rational
expectations solution to (11.1) for a given feedback rule (11.2) which is
assumed to be known by economic agents along with the model and the
current endogenous variables.3 Substituting (11.2) into (11.3), we obtain
[re]= [A+ BD][z]
dt+ dv (11.4)
We are concerned only with solutions to (11.4) which have the saddle-point
property that the number of eigenvalues of A + BD with positive part (H
equals rn, the remaining n—rn eigenvalues having negative real parts. We
shall assume that the pair (A, B) is stabilizable in the sense that there exists
at least one D such that A + BD has the saddle-point property. Then wi
stochastic stability follows since we only have additive disturbances
(Turnovsky (1977)). We now require the immediate response of the TI
non-predetermined variables x to the feedback rule (11.2). This is found
by first forming the matrix of left eigenvectors of A + BD, M say, with rows
ordered so that the first n —mare the eigenvectors associated with the stable wI





where M11 is an (n —rn)x (n —rn)matrix and M22 is rn x rn. Then, provided
that A + BD has the saddle-point property, the rational expectations
S
solution places the trajectory on the unique saddle path
x =— M21 z =— Nz (11.6)
The feedback rule (11.2) now becomes OP!
no.
w =(D1—D2N)z=13z (11.7)
where D =[D1D2] with D1 of dimension r x (n —m)and D2 of dimension
L
SInterdependent macroeconomic policy 235
._ rx m. We note that (11.7) is a feedback rule only on the predetermined
Ie variables. It follows immediately that D is unique only up to choice of 15,
it so that without loss of generality we can confine attention to linear time
er invariant feedback rules on the predetermined variables, z, alone (i.e.
tO D2 =O).4Let A be partitioned as for M, B
=
whereB' is (n—rn) x r,
of
B2 is rn x r and dv= wheredv' is (n—rn) x 1 and dv2 is rn x 1. Then
es substituting (11.6) and (11.7) into (11.1), we have from the first (n—rn) rows
thatdz =[A1,—A12N+B'15]zdt+dv'. (11.8)




eC(t8)dv'(s) + ect z(0) (11.9)
he o
whereC =[A11—A,,N+B'15].Equations (11.6) and (11.9) constitute the
rational expectations solution to (II.!) for a given feedback rule (11.2).
.4) The second step of the control problem is to optimise with respect to
• 15. This requires us to allow for the fact that N depends on D. Substituting
• (11.2) into (11.3), we have
We asyE(W) =tr(asyE(W))=tr((Q+DTRD) Y) (11.10)
sts
en where Y =asy and we have used the result tr(ABC) =tr(CAB).
The asymptotic covariance matrix z= asyE(zTz) satisfies
rid ZC'+CZ+E11=0 (II.!!)




ed The welfare loss asyE(W) can now be minimised with respect to iS by a
• standard numerical gradient method, subject to the constraint that the 'ns
saddle-point property is preserved (i.e. that the number of eigenvalues of
A + B'D with positive real part is equal to m).
.6) From the form of (11.11) and (11.12), it is clear that, in general, the
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11.2The fulloptimalrule
Thefollowing is a solution procedure, employing Pontryagin's
maximum principle, first proposed by Calvo (1978) and later developed
by Driffihl (1982) and Miller and Salmon We consider first the an




Then on introducing the costate row vector A(t), by the
maximum principle we minimise
mi
JW+$A(Ay+Bw_y)dt (11.15) an




J = (11.17) D
pr
Hence, considenng arbitrary variations in A, 1J =0if and only if
(11.18) wI
which, from (11.16), is simply the model (11.1) in the deterministic case.
Now consider variations in J due to independent variations in w and Y an







Partition A(0)= [A1(0),A2(0)] where A1 is 1 x(n—rn) andA2 is 1 x m.Then
A(0) ôy(O) =A1(0)8z(0)+ A2(0) ôx(O) =A2(0)ôx(O)sincez(t)ispredetermined
(i.e. z(0) is given). It follows that U =0for arbitrary changes 8x(O),
ôy and 8w if and only if






The condition (11.22) can also be obtained (Driffill (1982)) by using
•4) I3W the standard result that8(0)
=A(O)at the optimal point. Hence
L 8W
=A2(0).But the welfare loss must be insensitive to changes in the
8W
initial values of the non-predetermined vanables x(0). Thus = 0
•5) and the result follows.




7) Define p = Then the optimal rule for the deterministic control




—[A_BR.1BT1 —H 1128 - _AT J-
3' and z, p satisfy the boundary conditions that z(0) is given, p2(O) =0and
p(r)0.
It is a standard result in control theory (see, for example, Kwakernaak
9) and Sivan, p. 147) that provided H has 2n distinct eigenvalues, n of these
associated with predetermined variables [zTpfl will be stable and n
associated with non-predetermined variables [xTpfl will be unstable where
pT=[pt',pfl. Then re-arranging (11.28) we have
± A11—J12 —J11 z z
0) P2 —Q21 —Q22 P2 P2
= T T =H (11.29)
p1 —Q11—A12 — A11— Q12 p1 p1
A21 A22 x x
where J = and matrices A, J and Qarepartitioned as before.
Equation (11.29) expresses the model in a form analogous to the standard
1) deterministic rational expectations model. The case of the infinite time
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horizon, r-÷ isanalytically tractable. For in this case (using an
argument analogous to that leading to (11.6) the rational expectations
assumption that y(t)-÷O as t—. co (i.e. the model is stable) together with




where Uisthe matrix of left-eigenvectors of H formed and partitioned












and 1? is partitioned into four n x n blocks. The solution to (11.32) is
[z]= = eCt . (11.33)
which completes the optimal control solution in closed loop and open-loop
form.
From the bottom m rows of (11.30) we have that x — z — N22p2 i.e.,








Matrix S is, of course, the non-negative definite solution to the familiar
Riccati equation and (II.35)—(II.38) provide a convenient method of
finding such a solution. However the feedback rule (11.34) can only be
implemented in conjunction with the nth order system under control,
namely (11.28) or (11.29). If the rule were to be announced in the form
_______________________-.
.
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an (11.34) alone and the private agents' information set consisted of the model
(II.!) and current values of z and x, then the argument of Section 11.2 shows
'ith that it would be equivalent to a feedback rule on z alone, and that the
hip resulting system has order only (n —m). Thisresult contrasts with the
standard case where free variables are absent, so that p2 and x have zero
•30) dimension and the optimal rule can be implemented by means of a linear
time-invariant feedback rule on the state vector, z. However, the full
ned optimal rule may be implemented by linear feedback on z combined with
ible elements of integral feedback on z; this-follows since, from (".32), P2 may
be expressed as a suitable integral of z.
For the stochastic control problem, we note that it is a standard result
of control theory that certainty equivalence applies as between the
.31) deterministic and stochastic optimisation problems and this carries over
to rational expectations models.6 This enables us to calculate the loss under
the optimal policy for the stochastic case. From (11.30), using p2(0) =0,
is
- wehave p1(O) =—z(0). But for the deterministic case, W =W(z(0)),
dW -.
withW(0) =0.Also =2p1(0)=— 2N11z(0). Hence integrating, we
32) have /
W= z(0) (11.39)
since issymmetric and non-positive definite. The corresponding
welfare lossinthestochastic caseisthe same provided we put
.33) z(0) zT(0) =where coy (dv') =E11dt. (See Levine and Currie (1984).)
Thus since (11.31) and (11.32) define the optimal rule for the deterministic
problem,they also define the optimal rule for the stochastic counterpart
quite independently of the covariance matrix of the disturbances perturbing
i.e., the system.
11.3 A two-country closed-loop Nash game
34) Equation (11.1) is sufficiently general to represent an n-country
model of interdependent economies. In particular for the case of two
35) countries denote as unstarred variables those referring to country 1 (the
36) 'home' country) and starred variables for country 2 (the 'overseas' sector).
Then we may write a two-country model in the form
dz z dv1
38) dz* d*
=A dz+[B, B*J L*] dt+ (11.40)
.iar dx x w dv,
of dx* dvi'
be
ol, where the dimensions of z, z*, x and x x 1,x 1
x.1 respectively.240 David Curne and Paul Levine
Considerfirst the case of the two countries pursuing simple rules of the Iii





Z (II41) the x
* do x






where we denote dvT =
In a Nash game each 'player' chooses its own move taking the current
observed 'moves' of other players as given. In a closed-loop Nash game
these moves of other players are observed in feedback form on the state 2's
vector. For the two-country game presented here this means that country I w
1 chooses a feedback rule Na
dyr
w = (11.43)




with a similar loss function asy E( W*) for country 2, QandR being B
replaced with QandR* respectively. Then the optimisation problem of (n
country1 —tominimise asy E(W)subjectto (11.42) —isin the form of the
problem solved in 11.1 above and leads to an optimal value for D in the
form of a reaction function D =RD*). Similarly country 2 has a reaction
function D* =g(D)and the Nash equilibrium is at the fixed-point of fg
forD andgfforD*.
A plausible adjustment process by which countries move towards a
closed-loop Nash equilibrium is the following Cournot-type sequence of
moves. Given an initial feedback. rule for country 2 withdenoted by
D*(0), country 1 chooses D =D(1) Then country 2 revises its
choice of D* to =g(D(1)).Country I then re-optimises and so on.Interdependent macroeconomic policy 241
th
Thisprocessmay or may not converge to an equilibrium depending on
e the initial value of D*.Indeeda Nash equilibrium may not exist and if
it does it may not be unique. Given the complexity of models with rational
expectations, it seems a formidable task to obtain analytical conditions for
41 the existence, uniqueness and convergence of a Nash equilibrium and we
/ donot attempt to do so here.
• Consider next the full optimal policy for the two-country model.
mic Suppose country 2 adopts an optimal rule which from section 11.2 can be









has dimensions (m+m*) x 1 and dependson A, B, B* and country
tate 2's loss function. (Country 2 could arrive at (11.45) by assuming country
itry 1 was pursuing a simple rule of the type considered above.) In a closed-loop




=A dt+0wdt+ 0 (11.47)





and we have partitioned A so that A,, is (n+n*_m_m*) x
ing Bsothat B'is(n+n*_m_m*)xr,D* = [Dr, Dfl with
of (n+n*_m_m*) and P* similarly. The optimal feedback rule of country
the
1is then of the form
the
ion





a242 David Curne and Paul Levine
and p2 has dimensions (m+m*)x 1.Comparing (11.45) and (11.49) we see
that matrices D and D* defining the feedback rules are not comparable
as they have different dimensions.
The reaction function analysis adopted from simple rules is now not
applicable. If we envisaged a Cournot-type adjustment process, then with
each iteration the model defining the dynamic constraint for the optimising
W
countryincreases its dimension by the number of non-predetermined
variables m+m*. The game may well converge in the sense that the
coefficients of D and D* relating to the additional p2 andterms tend
to zero and the welfare loss tends to a finite quantity. However, the
possibility of countries actually engaging in games of such complexity
seems remote and it would appear that the full optimal closed-loop Nash
game is not a plausible form of non-cooperative behaviour. The problem
with the full optimal closed-loop Nash game arises because for a single
country the full optimal (time inconsistent) rule cannot be implemented
as a linear feedback on the state vector alone (Levine and Currie (1984)).
If we confine ourselves to simple (and, in general, time-inconsistent) rules
of the form (11.41) and (11.43) the problem does not arise. Nor does it arise
if one focuses on time-consistent (but sub-optimal) policies for government
or on Nash open-loop games between countries (see Miller and Salmon
(1984)). All these options form interesting directions for research; but in B
this paper we shall analyse non-cooperative behaviour only in terms of the at
first, namely simple policy rules. . tr
fr
ol
Ill The model d
Throughout the rest of this paper we use variants of the following eleven
equation continuous time stochastic model:
dy = (hhl.l)
dm = (111.2)
dv =[_çz5os_çbiy+cb2q+cb3y*]dt_dp (111.3) dd











th where the following notation is used:
enominalexchangerate(definedasthepriceofforeignexchange)
he y real output
q competitiveness
he rdomestic nominal rate of interest
sautonomous taxation
—sh vreal net financial wealth of the private sector
m m nominal money supply
p general price index
pd price index of domestic output
w nominal wages
es w*nominal wages overseas
se r* foreign nominal rate of interest
nt white noise disturbance
Because we are concerned in this paper only with stabilization of the system
around an exogenously given long run equilibrium (which may incorporate
trends), all variables are measured in terms of deviations of their logarithm
from equilibrium, except for interest rates which are measured as deviations
of proportions. All parameters are defined to be positive. An 'e' superscript
denotes an expectation formed at time tonthe basis of information
available up to timet;while a superscriptdenotes the foreign
counterpart to the variable in question. A bar denotes a partial equilibrium
value. Equation (III. 1) represents the IS curve with output adjusting
1) sluggishly with a mean lag of 1frj1 to competitiveness, the real interest rate,
real financial wealth, autonomous taxes and foreign demand. Equation
(111.2) represent the LM curve. The money supply is assumed to be demand
3) determined for any given level of interest rates, and money demand adjusts
sluggishly to output, interest rates and real financial wealth with a mean
lag Equation (111.3) determines the change in real wealth from the
- determinantsof the sum of the government budget deficit and the current
account of the balance of payments. Neglecting interesting payments and
approximating this relationship log-linearly, this makes the change in real
wealth depend positively on competitiveness and foreign output, and
7) negatively on domestic output, autonomous taxes and inflation. Equation
3) (111.4) determines the level of nominal wages. Taking the derivative of its244 David Currie and Paul Levine
deterministicpart, we have that long-run wage inflation is determined by w
an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, but with actual wage inflation tv
adjusting sluggishly towards this long-run relationship. The sluggishness fu
of wave adjustment generates fluctuations in real output in the face of
demand disturbances, even under rational expectations. (See, for example,
Buiter (1980)). Equation (111.5) is a partial equilibrium relationship giving W
theprice index of domestic output in equilibrium as a weighted average bt
of domestic and foreign wages (the influence of the latter variable working th
partly through a mark-up on costs and partly through competitive pricing CC
effects).The corresponding general price index in partial equilibrium is
givenfrom (111.6) as a weighted average of domestic prices and foreign S(
wages. Actual prices adjust quickly but not instantly according to (111.7)
whereis large.7 Equation (111.8) models the exchange rate as asset CF
marketdetermined under conditions of perfect capital mobility.8 The di
expected rate of depreciation of the exchange rate in an interval dt (denoted
by dee =ee(t+dt,t)—e(t) where ee(T,t) isthe expected exchange rate at
time r, formed at time t)exactlyoffsets the interest rate differential in
favourof the home currency. (Note that r =0in equilibrium corresponds
to the domestic and foreign interest rates being equal.) Unlike other
variables, which adjust slowly and are predetermined variables, the
exchange rate is non-predetermined and can make discrete jumps in
response to changes in exogenous variables or policy rules. Equation (111.9)
defines competitiveness in terms of relative costs: Equations (111.10) and
w
(111.11) specify exogenous first order autoregressive processes for foreign
fi wages and foreign interest rates respectively. Some persistence in these
disturbances is required if they are to have any impact on domestic
variables, and this process involves the minimum additional complication.
Equations (III.!) and (111.11) specify our model of the small open
economy. For the two-country analysis of interdependent economies, we
assume an identical structure for the overseas economy. Our model of the
overseas sectoristherefore given by equations (III. 1)—(11I.9), with
unstarred variables being replaced by starred variables and vice versa.9 In ed
the Appendix we set out the single country model and the two country
model in the form of equation (11.1).
For our subsequent policy design analysis, we need to define a suitable
loss function. Our loss function for the single country is assumed to take
the form
W=ay2+bp2+cr2+s2 (111.12)
while for the two country case we assume an aggregate loss function of
the form
wa =a(ya)2+b(pa)2+ c(ra)2 + (111.13)Interdependent macroeconomic policy 245
b where the 'a' superscript denotes the sum of the relevant variables over the
two countries (e.g.= We may also consider a divergence loss
function given by:
of Wa =a(j4)l+b(pd)l+c(,4)l+(sd)l (111.14)
le, where the 'd' superscript denotes the divergence of the relevant variable
•ng between the two countries (e.g. yd =y_y*).As shown in the Appendix,
ge the assumption of two identical countries permits us to decompose the two
ng country model into two orthogonal parts, the aggregate model (given by
ng (A.4)) and the divergence model (given by (AS)). As explained in
IS Section VI, we may therefore choose aggregate rules to minimise the
aggregate loss function, given the aggregate model; and, quite separately,
choose divergence rules to minimise the divergence loss function, given the
divergence model. Since
ed
•at where is the value of (111.12) evaluated over foreign variables, this
Ifl amounts to minimising a loss function consisting of the sum of the
ds individual countries' loss functions.
ier Our assumed parameter values are set out in Table 6.1, together with
•he variants of a number of parameter values to test for robustness of policies
Ifl with respect to parameter change. The parameteris set equal to the
9) degree of openness, 1 c1. Forthe parameter of the objective function,
nd we assume c= 1,penalising equally variations in rand s.Wepenalise price
gn fluctuations twice as much (b2) relative to the instruments, and for our
central assumptions penalise output and price fluctuations equally (a =2).
tic We also consider a Keynesian variant in which output fluctuations are
fl. penalised much more heavily (a =5).Only results for central parameter
en values are reported in Tables 6.2—14.
we
he
th IV Thedesignof rules for monetary and fiscal policy in a small open
In economy
ry In this section we review results considered in more detail in Currie and
Levine (1985)forthe small open economy. We first consider monetary
policy alone, thus holding the fiscal instrument, autonomous taxes,
e constant. Since tax receipts fluctuate with the level of economic activity,
this amounts to allowing automatic fiscal stabilisers to operate unimpeded.




IV 1 /ky+p)nominal income rule
3) ftp price level rule
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where/i is chosen optimally by the procedure outlined in Section 11.1. Each
of the rules provides a long run anchor for expected nominal variables
provided that disturbances to the system follow stationary processes.'° In
the case of the exchange rate target, this anchor depends on foreign prices
following a stationary process, but trends in foreign prices may be offset
by a suitable trend in the exchange rate along the long run equilibrium
path.
We next consider the use of fiscal policy (represented in the model by
autonomous tax changes) in conjunction with monetary policy. We
consider three forms of decoupled control rules given by
DCRI
DCR iir =/31e (IV.2)
F
DCRI, represents a Meade-type assignment of using fiscal policy
to keep nominal income on track and monetary policy to stabilise the real
exchange rate. DCR II is similar, except monetary policy now tracks the
nominal, rather than the real, exchange rate. DCR III represents an
extension of the price rule in (IV. 1) whereby monetary policy is assigned
to the price level while fiscal policy reacts to real output fluctuations. This
rule implies that a rise in output, for example, generates a contraction of T
fiscal policy, with a subsequent tightening of monetary policy as and when
there is an effect of higher output on inflation. All these rules are of a simple
proportioned form: as noted below, elements of integral control may also
be desirable.
The solution procedure described in Section 11.1 can now be used to find
values off? for rule (IV.!), and of/i1 and /12 for (IV.2), that minimise asy (W)
with W given by (III.12).h1 As noted in that section certainty equivalence
does not apply for simple rules so that the design of each category of rules
depends on the covariance matrix of the disturbances. Our approach to ç
thisproblem is to consider one disturbance at a time and choose the
optimal value of the parameter (or parameters) for each rule. We then
evaluate the welfare loss for the chosen optimal rule when each of the other
shocks in turn hits the system.
For each form of simple rule then there exist up to five optimal rules
corresponding to anticipated disturbances u1, i =1,5. In Table 6.2 we
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Table 6.2. Best policy rules and welfare losses for the single open economy
Policy rule
Disturbances
du1 du2 du3 du4 du5
Minimal control 2.44 0.00 1.22 0.96 3.83
Optimal monetary2.28 0.00 0.39 0.09 0.39
Optimal monetary1.50 0.00 0.22 0.09 0.31
+ fiscal
r=0.56(y+p) 3.08 0.00 0.82 0.16 1.04
r =0.77m 3.82 0.48 0.68 0.27 1.09
r = 4.02p 2.31 0.00 0.47 0.16 0.46
r=
s =0.46y j
2.04 0.00 0.38 0.19 0.75
r =2.87k
s= l.24yj
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andloss function asy E(2y2 + 2p2 + r2+52). Formonetary policy alone the
exchange rate rule, because of the segmentation of the model under this
regime, gives no improvement on minimal control for all disturbances
except u5andeven for that disturbance it performs relatively badly.'2 There
is little to choose between the best nominal income and monetary rules
reported; the former performs better for u1 and u2 shocks and the latter
for a u3 shock. but the rule that completely dominates in category (IV.l)
is the price rule, i.e. irrespective of the nature of the disturbance the best
price rule is superior to the best monetary rule, nominal income or
exchange rate rules. In addition, comparison with the performance of the
full optimal rule shows that its performance compares quite well with this
benchmark, particularly for domestic shocks. Thus the costs of simplicity
do not appear to be enormous for this rule. The other simple rules, by
contrast, perform rather badly overall.
It is a familiar result from the government budget constraint literature
(see, for example, Blinder and Solow (1973), Christ (1979)) that monetary
targeting may be unstable if the wealth effects on money demand are large
relative to those on expenditure. To check whether this was at the root
of the poor performance of the monetary targets, we examined the
consequences of increasing fisothat the money supply is kept strictly on
a fixed track. The results reported in Table 6.3 indicate that there is no
tendency for instability of the model under strict monetary targeting,
suggesting that monetary targets perform badly because of their failure to
dampen volatility rather than because of inherent instability.
For the central parameter set we also find the price rule is rather robust
in its performance. A choice of/I somewhere in the range between 2 and
10 yields a similar performance that is insensitive to disturbance uncertainty.
To examine the consequences of parameter variation, we subjected the
model to a variety of parameter changes (see Table 6.1). These include a
more Keynesian objective function, an increased degree of openness, a
large impact of demand on inflation, an increased effect of wealth on money
demand, an increased direct influence of monetary policy on demand, and
reduced wealth effects on aggregate demand and money demand. While
the details of these results vary, the superiority and robustness of the price
level rule remains intact; while the performance of the other simple rules
remains poor. The only significant difference is if the influence of demand II..
on inflation is stepped up, when the performance of the price level rule
relative to the full optimal rule falls significantly in dealing with domestic
shocks. del
Turning to rule (IV.2) we find that DCR I and DCR II perform badly
and are ruled out as plausible policy rules. DCR III in the form of two b
variants performs well but in neither case is there a clear-cut improvement to
4Interdependent macroeconomic policy 249
he Table 6.3. The consequences of monetary targeting. Policy rules rfin,
























































































































































































































on the best price rule using monetary policy alone. The first variant of DCR
III improves the performance in the face of u1 and u3 shocks at the expense
of a deterioration in the face of u4 and u5. The second variant provides
still more improvement in the face of u3 shocks at the expense of a
deterioration for u1 and u5 shocks.
The top of Table 6.2 presents comparisons with full optimal policies,
both for monetary policy alone and for fiscal and monetary policy
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handling domestic disturbances. In consequence, optimal policy signifi-
cantly outperforms our best simple rules with respect to all disturbances.
Moreover, additional simulations showed that the performance of the
optimal rule is robust with respect to parameter changes. When fiscal policy
is considered, therefore, the costs of simplicity are high. However, the price
level rule continues to perform well relative to other forms of simple rule.
The poorer performance of the price rule relative to optimal policy when
fiscal policy is considered may reflect the absence of any elements of
integral control in the design of our simple rules.It remains to be
investigated whether better rules can be devised that incorporate integral
as well as proportional feedback, whilst remaining simple in design.
V The cooperative two country control problem
Hitherto in this paper, we have considered policy design in the small open
economy, treating the rest of the world as exogenous. In this section, we
examine the consequences of assuming two interdependent economies,
each identical to the model described in Section III and assumed throughout
our previous analysis.
Our assumed loss function for the aggregate problem is described by
(III. 13), and penalises deviations in aggregate variables summed over the
two countries. An orthogonal divergence problem is that defined by
minimising a loss function (III. 14) defined over deviations of the differences
in variables between the two countries (see Appendix). The joint solution
to the aggregate and divergence problem is equivalent to minimising a loss P
function which is the sum of the individual country loss functions defined g
by (111.12). r
We focus first on the aggregate problem, and consider the performance UI
ofsimple rules in this context. Since the exchange rate does not enter the n4
aggregate problem, we ignore the exchange rate rule given in IV. 1, as well




anominal income rule where both monetary and fiscal fc
policy are used jointly to track nominal income. DCR IV represents a form
of decoupled control, where interest rates are used to track the money si$
supply and fiscal policy tracks nominal income. NIFR represents a sli
nominal income target pursued by fiscal policy alone. UInterdependent macroeconomic policy 251









































Table 6.4 presents results for the aggregate problem for the rules using
monetary policy alone (to be compared with the results of Section IV.
Because the scope for monetary policy is much less for the aggregate
problem, with the channel of influence via the exchange rate ruled out, the
gain from control is not large. This may be seen by comparing the results
reported for minimal and optimal control respectively. Of the simple rules,
the price rule gives no gain whatever relative to minimal control. Both
nominal income and monetary rules give some gain, the nominal income
rule coping better with demand (u1) shocks and the monetary rule
performing better for supply shocks (u3).
The bottom part of Table 6.4 reports the performance of the best simple
rules designed for the single economy reported in Section IV when applied
in both countries simultaneously. The nominal income and monetary rules
are not dissimilar to those devised for the aggregate country. The price rule,
by contrast represents a rather active feedback on prices, and for the
aggregate economy it is totally destabilising. Thus the best rule designed
for the single open economy is disastrous in its performance when applied
generally. Similar problems apply to the full optimal rule designed for the
single economy, when applied generally. Although it is stable, Table 6.4
shows its performance to be very poor. This highlights the dangers of the



























all optimal 3.30 8.31















DCR IV r =0.29m
s= 0.12(y+p)
NIFR s=O.15(y+p)














The results in Table 6.5forthe two country problem with joint fiscal
and monetary policy indicate the important role for fiscal policy in the
aggregate problem. The optimal policy gives very considerable gain when
fiscal policy is used. Of the simple rules examined in Table 6.5,DCRIII
gives the best performance. However, the parameter in the interest rate part
of this rule indicates that monetary policy is playing a minimal part in this
rule, and the full burden of control falls on fiscal policy. This rule reduces
to simple Keynesian policy of controlling output by fiscal feedback on
output. The performance of the other rules is broadly similar, because of
the limited influence of monetary policy, and amounts to fiscal feedback
on nominal income. This performs poorly relative to optimal policy or
DCR III.
The performance of the best rules for monetary and fiscal policy
reported in Section IV for the single open economy are reported at the
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Table 6.6. The divergence component of the two-country problem
Monetary policy alone (s =0) Actual
disturbance
Expected
.disturbancePolicy rule dü1 4ü3
all optimal 1.390.10
minimal control(r =0.0001 m) 1.400.10
du1 exchange rate 1.400.10
nominal income(r =0.0001(y+p))1.400.10
monetary (r = 0.0001m) 1.400.10
price (r =0.008p) 1.400.10
du3 exchange rate 1.400.10
nominal income(r = 0.0001(y+p))1.400.10
monetary (r =0.0001m) 1.400.10
price (r =O.005p) 1.400.10





du, DCRIII r = 0.01p
s=0.29y
1.340.09
















bottom of Table 6.5. In contrast to the use of monetary policy alone, the
simple rules do not totally destabilise the system. However, their
performance is poor, whilst the full optimal rule designed for the single
open economy is totally destabilising when applied in the aggregate.
We have not carried out any thorough testing of the robustness of the
results of this section. However, we have examined the effects of giving
monetary policy a greater channel of influence in the aggregate problem
by choosing the higher variant for z2 in Table 6.1. Although this gave
monetary policy a greater role it did not alter the broad results. In
particular, the result that policies devised for the single open economy
perform badly in the aggregate continues strikingly to stand out.
We have derived these results for the two-country case, but they have
a more general interpretation. This is because the aggregate problem can
be derived from the aggregation of the n-country generalisation of the two
country analysis presented in the Appendix. The larger the number of254 DavidCurrie and Paul Levine
countries, the greater will be the difficulty in sustaining the optimal rules
for the aggregate stabilisation problem presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5,
and in preventing single countries adopting the optimal rules reported in
Section IV. Our results focus attention directly on the incentive to renege
on cooperative forms of international behaviour, despite the rather serious
consequences for performance if all countries do, indeed, renege.
The results for the cooperative solution to the divergence problem are
reported in Table 6.6. For monetary policy alone (reported in the upper
part of the table), there is no gain whatever to control, whether simple or
full optimal. This contrasts markedly with the solution to the single
country problem. The lower part of the Table shows that there is some
scope for fiscal action of a mild kind. However, these benefits of control
show up only for the optimal rule, and the simple fiscal rules show little
or no benefit relative to minimal control.
These results one more highlight the marked differences between the
cooperative two country solution to the control problem and that thrown
up by single country optimisation. They suggest that there is a serious
free-rider problem in the design of international policy. To examine this
further, in the next section we consider policy design in an explicit game
theoretic framework.
VI Two-country non-cooperative games
In this section we consider non-cooperative behaviour for two identical
countries in the form of a Cournot-type adjustment process leading to a
closed-loop Nash equilibrium. We assume that each country pursues the
same form of simple rule and we consider monetary policy only. To
simplify matters still further we consider shocks (u1,ut), and(u3,in pairs
so that each country is experiencing either an aggregate demand shock or
a supply shock in common. We put var (du1) =var(dut) =0.5di for i =
and3 and assume that disturbances in different countries are independent.'3
Then var (du?) =var =dtand the welfare loss may be compared
with that for cooperative already considered.
Suppose a cooperative policy is agreed in the form of the simple rules
examined in Table 6.4. We can investigate the incentive to renege (i.e., the
short-term gain) and the long-term consequence by following a Cournot-
type sequence of decisions. The results are displayed in Tables 6.7—14 below
for central parameter values with loss functions asy E(2y2 + 2p2 + r2) and
asy E(2y*2 ++ r*2), for a monetary rule (r/im and r* =flm*),a
nominal income rule (r =/J(y+p)and r* =fl(y*+p*))and a price level
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r =0.98m 4.94 4.10
r = 3.33m 6.44 5.10
is not considered because in this case an optimal fiisindeterminate ruling
out the existence of unique reaction functions.
Consider first the monetary rule. For a demand disturbance in view of
the slight benefits of divergence control the aggregate policy rd =0.71
of Table 6.4 implies that r =0.71m and r* =0.71m* for the two
countries. From Table 6.7 it can be seen from iteration 1 that the benefits
to country I from reneging and pursuing an optimal policy given country
2's policy r* =0.71m* are very small and the eventual Nash equilibrium
results in a rather greater (but still small) welfare loss. By contrast, for a
supply disturbance, both the short-term gains and the long-term losses are
quite considerable and at the Nash equilibrium the monetary rule is far
stronger (r3.32 m) than at the cooperative policy (r =0.53m). These
results suggest that if a joint policy is agreed between two countries in the
form of a monetary rule, a supply shock is far more likely to undermine
that agreement than a demand shock if the countries indulge in short-sighted
behaviour.
For a nominal income rule from Table 6.9 both types of disturbances
result in similar incentives to renege with only a slight long-term loss for
a demand shock as against a significant long-term loss for a supply shock.
This suggests that even a far-sighted country would be tempted to renege
when faced with a demand disturbance. An interesting point to note about
both monetary and nominal income rules is that if countries are engaged
in a Nash closed-loop game it may actually pay if they are wrong about
the nature of the shock hitting the two countries. Thus from Table 6.8 a
monetary rule designed with u? in mind results in a better outcome than
a rule designed formeven whenactually occurs. It follows that
countries pursuing a monetary rule benefit if they wrongly rule out the
possibility of ashock. For a nominal income rule Table 6.10 indicates
that countries will benefit if they are wrong on all occasions. If ashock
occurs it is better if countries expect a 4shockand if a 4shockoccurs
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For both monetary and nominal income rules that closed-loop Nash
equilibrium is symmetrical. For our final regime, a price level rule, this is
no longer the case. Starting at the best cooperative policy which in this
case is minimal control, the Cournot process converges to an asymmetrical
outcome with the country that moves first benefiting considerably at the
expense of the other, in both the short-term and long-term. (Note that we
have imposed an upper limit of/310 for all the rules.) For both demand
and supply shocks the country that reneges moves immediately to the
strongest possible feedback rule r =lOpleaving the second country's best
rule as minimal control (see Tables 6.11 and 6.12). Tables 6.13 and 6.13
report results starting at r =prather than minimal control. For disturbance
the country that moves first loses out and the second country benefits
whereas for a 4disturbance,the final outcome is a symmetrical Nash
equilibrium at r0.76 p. As yet we have not been able to find a starting
point which yields a symmetrical equilibrium for a 4 shock.
These results suggest that the incentive to renege on the cooperative
monetary or nominal income rule, while adhering to the overall constraint
of such a simple rule, is not large. By contrast, the price rule offers a very
considerable incentive to renege, particularly since the country that reneges
first secures long run, not just short run, benefit. It seems that the price
rule, and policies like it, are inimical to international cooperation.
VII Conclusions
In this paper, we have been concerned with the design of macroeconomic
policy in a stochastic interdependent world. This analysis was conducted
in terms of a model that is rather more complex in its interactions and
dynamics than is usual in the analytical literature on policy interdependence,
allowing for wage/price dynamics, asset accumulation and exchange rate
dynamics.
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* Country2 in brackets (where different).
stochastic rational expectations models with complex dynamics, and also
showed how restricted or simple optimal rules may be derived. This latter
aspect of policy design assumes significance in view of the importance
attached to restrictions on policy design (e.g. monetary or nominal income
targeting) in current policy debates. But simple or restricted design carries
with it the cost that certainty equivalence no longer holds, so that the design
of policy is no longer independent of the nature of the shocks perturbing
the system. Methods of handling these complications are set out in
Sections II and IV. In addition, Section II sets out the method for deriving
the Nash solution to a two country policy game a Nash
game between the countries pursuing simple rules. The Nash game between
the countries pursuing the optimal rule is shown to lead to an ever-
expanding state vector.
In our subsequent analysis, we applied these methods to an examination
of the effectiveness of the full optimal policy and a variety of simple rules
in stabilisation. What our results bring out clearly is the divergence
between policy design in the single open economy and in the global
economy. This divergence arises from externalities in policy design in an
interdependent world. It leads to the possibility of free-riding behaviour;
as countries renege on cooperative policy design.
This raises the question as to how best to contain such free-riding
behaviour within a system of international policy coordination. Advances
in the theory of noncooperative game theory suggest that this may not be
as intractable a problem as is usually assumed.'4 This is because forms of
tit-for-tat strategy can be shown to be rather robust strategies in dealing
with repeated games of the prisoner's dilemma type so frequently encoun-
tered in problems of international policy coordination. However, our
results also show that not all aspects of the international policy game are
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* Country2 in brackets (where different).
the price rule, where one country can secure a lasting gain at the expense
of the other. This arises because, in this game, tit-for-tat amounts to the
threat to destabilise the system totally, and may therefore not be credible.
Similar results may well apply more generally to strategies that rely on w—
1
manipulating the exchange rate under a regime of floating rates to secure
domestic objectives at the expense of global aims. ani
It may be that other forms of macropolicy threats may be credible in
containing this form of behaviour, and this is an issue that needs more
detailed consideration. Alternatively, it may be that a wider class of
threats, involving factors outside the field of international policy, is
required to sustain international cooperation. If this is so, our analysis
offers a possible additional argument for simple rules, particularly con-
cerning the targeting of the money supply or nominal income: that by
formulating policy in these terms, one may rule out the noncooperative
forms of behaviour implied by the price level rule and by full optimal
behaviour. :9
Appendix
In this appendix, we set out the models analysed in the main paper in the
form of equation (11.1); that is,
[zlAFzldBd+d (Al) Ldxej LXJ
(I)The single country model
We let n =fyds,so that dn =ydt.We also treatas given dj










o o 0 0
0 0 0
o o 0 0







Exploiting the symmetry of this model, we may follow Aoki (1981) by
decomposing this model, into two orthogonal components, the aggregate
model and the divergence model. Thus let Za= U? =
I
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(ii) The two country model
For this case, from equations (III.1)—(III.7) we may write the




m 0 0 0 010000
v 0 0 0 000000 dii,
w 0 0 0 00 1000 du,
p B= 0 0 0,dv= 000000 du,
n 0 —If-,',, 000000 du1
0 _If',y,0 000 100 du,
m 0 0 —If, 0000I0 du,'
0 0 0 000000
w' 0 0 0 000001
p5 0 0 0 000000
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=r+r*, S"= Thenthe aggregate model (denoted by an 'a'
superscript) is given by (A.!) with
—!fr1(l—cx5) 0 —
V'2)'2 0 V'2 0
= 00 ifr4 0 ,=
0 00 —V'3 1fr3 V'3fl1
0 00 —V'4 o p







andwhere the x vector has zero dimension. It will be noted that the
aggregate model contains no free variables.
Using a 'd' superscript to denote the divergence model, and letting
=z—uf =uj—u,=r—r*,sd =s—then the divergence model
is given by (A.l) with:
0 0
—ti', 0 0 0
+0,) 0 0 —8,)+2ç61) .0 8,)
A1= 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 —8,) — 0 8,
0 00 0 0 0 0
0 00 0 0 0 0
—%fr,a2 I 00
0 0 I 0
rn' 0 000
0 dv'=00 01d141"=["] (A.5)
0 0 000Ld14J,
pd o o 000
0 000
andwhere x = e.
NOTES
*DavidCurrie acknowledges the financial support of the ESRC and H.M.
Treasury; Paul Levine acknowledges the financial support of the Nuffield
Foundation and the ESRC.
1 The rational expectations equilibria considered in this paper may be thought
of as Stackelberg equilibria, with the government as leader and the private266 David Currie and Paul Levine
sector as follower. By reneging consistently, the government relinquishes its
leadership role.
2 We can formally evaluate the incentive to renege faced by a myopic government C
by assuming a given discount rate. This requires us to consider the derivation
of optimal rules with time-discounting, as in Levine and Currie (1984). C
3 This solution is based on Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Dixit (1980). For
further details, see Currie and Levine (1982).
4 This result does not carry over to the discrete time cases. See Levine and Currie C
(1984).
5Forfurther discussion, see Levine and Currie (1984). C
6 For further analysis, see Levine and Currie (1984).
7 This partial adjustment process is incorporated for technical reasons. Ifis
large, as it is in the subsequent analysis, it is as though (111.5) and (111.6) hold C
instantaneously.
8 We are concerned with deviations of the system from long run equilibrium.
Assuming that the current account is in equilibrium in this long run equilibrium, C
it is plausible to assume that transitory current account imbalances cause no
divergence between ex ante domestic and foreign interest rates expressed in the
same currency.
9 Since foreign wages and interest rates are now separately determined (with
persistence), equations (3.10) and (3.11) are dropped. Note that e*—e.g
10 Non-stationary disturbance require the addition of integral control to tie down
nominal variables, though at the cost of making instruments non-stationary. D
We exclude this case here.
11 FORTRAN programs have been written to implement the solution procedures
of section II. D
12 Strictly speaking, setting fi= 0for the other rules leads to indeterminacy of
nominal variables. However, this problem can be avoided and the loss made H
as close to zero as desired by choosing fitobe positive but small. We refer to
this case as 'minimal control' in what follows.
13 We have also considered the opposite extreme,andperfectly correlated.
The same qualitative conclusions reached for uncorrelated disturbances still
hold.
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COMMENT DAVID K. H. BEGG
exi
David Currie and Paul Levine have given us an interesting paper. They
emphasise the need for simple rules, yet, aside from some general remarks tO(
about the ease of secunng international cooperation, they offer little formal
justification for the advantages of simple rules. I begin by arguing that the au
issues of time consistency and credibility can be used to suggest why we
might be interested in formulating rules in a simple way.
Given a deterministic model with full information, there is no distinction
between open-loop and closed-loop rules, and I suggest optimal policy casj
design is as follows. If future actions can truly be precommitted, the co
possibility of time inconsistency simply does not arise. If precommitment ch
is not possible, a time consistent plan can be formulated by adopting the I
backward recursion of dynamic programming, which recognises that sta
bygones are bygone as real time elapses and as decisions can be reconsidered. sec
In a deterministic perfect foresight model, time inconsistent policies are Th
simply incredible, to
Now consider a stochastic model. Partition all possible rules into those abi
components based exclusively on today's information set and those pn
innovation-contingent rules which specify how new information is reflected thi
in policy. Notice two things: first,itwill generally pay to use new do
information as it arrives. Innovation-contingent components are valuable thi
to policy makers. Second, the preceding perfect foresight discussion of time
consistency and credibility formally carries over to the stochastic model, otlg
provided it is applied to the part of the rules which conditions on today's
itis not costless for agents to monitor the actions
of the policy maker or to diagnose and process new information. There
will then arise an ambiguity. Suppose policy this period is different from
agents' expectation of policy this period, conditional on information in
some previous period. Should agents believe a policy maker who says that the
this merely represents the implementation of a previously announced dis
innovation-contingent feedback rule? Or does it represent an attempt to forInterdependent macroeconomic policy 269
sity renege on that part of the policy rule based purely on previous information?
In such circumstances, there may be much to be said for the pursuit of
simple rules if they are easier for agents to understand and to monitor.
In so doing, they may remove most of the problems which arise in a world
and in which reneging is easy, whilst simultaneously preferring the policy
maker's ability to implement an innovation-contingent feedback rule
which blunts the effects of genuine surprises as they hit the system.
Ideally, of course, reneging should be endogenous to the model, and the
asymmetric information on which its possibility depends should be made
explicit. In such a framework, one could then determine credibility
hey endogenously and thus conduct an examination of the incentives to cheat
—.rks today at the cost of losing reputation for the future.
rnal Before leaving the overall framework of the paper, I note that the
the authors adopt an asymptotic approximation to the policy maker's objective
we function. Thus the paper really complicates the dynamics of the structural
constraints for the sake of simplifying the dynamics of the intertemporal
•:ion objective function. For some purposes this may be an advance; in other
licy cases it may not. For example, many people would argue that a vital
the component of the Thatcher revolution in policy attitudes in Britain is the
ent changed priority of the future against the present.
•the I now consider the main sections of the paper. Section II presents a
hat standard linear-quadratic forward looking stochastic model in which the
•ed. second best time-invariant rule is compared with the 'fully optimal' rule.
are The latter is time inconsistent, and I have already made clear my objection
to this terminology. To be credible, such a rule must rely either on the
ose ability to make binding precommitments of policy or on its voluntary
ose precommitment through an analysis of the cost of losing reputation when
ted this is recognised as endogenous. Section II then specifies a two-country
tew closed-loop Nash game. Although preferable to an open-loop Nash game,
ble this specification still seems to me to have its drawbacks. Individual players
me are modelled as assessing their own strategies subject to the belief that the
tel, other player's reaction function is invariant, yet itis knowable that
y's different strategies by one player will cause the other player to revise that
reaction function. The Lucas critique applies in game theory too.
)flS Section III specialises the structural model to a familiar open economy
model with sluggish domestic price adjustment and perfect international
)m capital mobility. These seem reasonable. However, the loss function
in contains a term in the square of the level of prices. This is certainly not
iat the same as the notion that inflation is undesirable, nor is it a trivial
:ed discrepancy: itis a major conclusion of the paper that simple rules
to formulated as price rules behave rather differently from other types of
a -270 Commentby David K. H. Begg
simple rule. Before attributing too much importance to this result, I should wi
like to know the extent to which it reflects the particular specification of ret
the loss function. Some sensitivity analysis would be valuable here. re
Section IV begins with the third best problem of simple monetary rules, is 1
for example having nominal interest rates proportional to the price level
or to nominal income. At some stage, the authors refer to this as tK
'targeting'. This seems to me rather misleading. Even if one wishes to ad
target an intermediate variable, it is generally optimal to use all available
policy instruments to achieve this end. Next, the robustness of various rules
to specific shocks is examined. As I read it, the authors perturb each
disturbance separately. Yet in Section II they show that their simple rules
do not obey certainty equivalence, and that the parameters of these rules C(
arefunctions of the variance-covariance matrix of disturbances. That being
so, it would be nice if sensitivity analysis utilised shocks with a variance- I f4,
covariance matrix similar to that implicitly embodied in the parameters Prcj
of the simple rules whose robustness is being investigated. This leads on writ
to a related point. The authors' search for robust simple rules is very much I
a hit-and-miss affair. Particular specifications are contemplated, as if out of
of a hat, and their properties assessed. Why not start from the other end? a 1
In Section II we are shown how to calculate the optimal rule. Alternatively, wit
we could calculate the optimal linear time-invariant rule. From one of these cat
more general specifications, could we not examine the coefficient parameters opi
and hence make a more informed judgement 'about which exclusion ma
restrictions to impose in order to acquire a simple rule? cot
Having examined at length the question of a monetary rule alone, Currie , Cot
and Levine then consider the simultaneous choice of simple monetary and of
fiscal rules. Here simplicity means decoupling: each policy variable has a
rule with a single argument. Basically, the authors conclude that fiscal Ph'
policy matters in their model, but that it should be accompanied by a fee
monetary rule which takes the form of a price rule. Again, my earlier rut
remark applies. Without an examination of alternative loss functions, we loot
cannot be sure at this stage that the preference for a price rule does not vul4
reflect the particular way prices enter the loss function.
Section V extends the analysis to two countries, using the Aoki trick of the
dividing the problem into two orthogonal ones, the first dealing with
aggregate variables across countries and the second dealing with divergences
between countries. Here I find the conclusions sensible and appealing. witi
There is less scope for monetary policy than fiscal policy to affect aggregate He
variables. And it is shown that the interaction of unharmonised national pro
policies can easily lead to undesirable outcomes. met
Section VI deals briefly with 2-country non-cooperative games, and elec
begins to examine the incentive to renege. Short term gains are compared trat
--
___
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withlong term losses from a reduction in credibility. Given my earlier id remarks, I applaud the effort in this section. As yet, as the authors
0 recognise,this work is rather preliminary. For example, time discounting
is likely to be important in evaluating how to trade off present and future.
es, Here the simplified intertemporal objective function is concealing more
ye than it reveals. Similarly, conjectures which are based on the Cournot-
adjustment of the other player's reaction function are clearly systematically




I feel very privileged to have this opportunity to discuss the paper by
ers Professor Currie and Dr Levine, because it is rich in content and neatly
written.
ich In the first part of this paper, the authors sort out various ramifications
Dut of optimal control. Being a 'back of the envelope' theorist myself, I learned
a lot from their clear exposition of modern control technology combined
with the assumption of rational expectations. There are so many layers of
categories: constrained variables vs. free variables in initial conditions, full
.ers optimisation vs. time-invariant rules, general vs. simple rules, joint utility
ion maximisation vs. Cournot-Nashgames, closed loop vs. open ioop, time
consistent vs. unconstrained rules, and so forth. This paper sorts out these
complex layers. The description is compact but gives us a full understanding
md of the basic structure of the issues.
s a The second part of this paper develops an expectations augmented
cal Phillips curve model consisting of two countries. Since a time-invariant
a feedback rule is dependent on the covariance matrix, they examine simple
ier rules corresponding to each type of shock on LM, IS and supply curves,
we look for the best rule for each particular kind of shock, and examine
iot vulnerability of the system under the simple rule against types of shock
other than the system is designed for. The most reliable feedback rule is
of the price rule for the domestic economy, but this rule collapses when two
ith countries play a game with these simple rules.
When I was reading this paper, I was reminded of a conversation I had
with Dr. Hirotsugu Akaike, the founder of AIC of the time series model.
ate He was quite successful in reducing the variance in quality of concrete
rial production by applying some feedbacks to the system according to his
methods. He also succeeded in smoothing temperature fluctuations in
•nd electricity generation. Incidentally his institute is now studying adminis-
trative reform (fiscal consolidation) in Japan. He has to defend the raison272 Comment by Koichi Hamada
d'être of his institute by pointing out that the feedback system saved Tb
trillions of Yen. Dr Akaike is interested in the possibility of applying feed- fee
back systems to our economy as well. This paper gives us hope that some ass
day, unfortunately seemingly not in the immediate future, we may be able ecc
to control the economy like a concrete production process. rig
One of the most surprising results of this paper is that the simple price the
rule, which is stabilising in a closed economy, can cause total global M
destablisation in a two country context. This is somewhat counter-intuitive,
acombination of two stable systems of differential equations will pu
normally result in a stable system unless off-diagonal blocks expressing the on
interdependence are extremely important. My first question is how, in
an analytic as well as an economic sense, the authors interpret this wo
phenomenon, the
My next question concerns the statement of the authors on the last page, the
saying 'in this game, tit-for-tat amounts to the threat of destabilising the
system totally, and may therefore not be credible'. This is an interesting
remark, but I do not consider that this statement is the result of deduction shop
from the analytical part of the paper.I would like to hear more
clarification.
My comments are on the economics of these interesting experiments. My rate
first comment concerns the validity of the asymptotic system. We are all mo
constrained by history, that is by initial conditions at any time. It may take
a very long time to achieve the asymptotic statestochastic equilibrium. hig
I wonder how fast is the convergence speed of the deterministic part of infi
the system to a stationary equilibrium. It would be possible to tell the speed to
of convergence by examining the magnitude of the stable roots of the ma
system. If it takes a rather short time to reach equilibrium, these rati
experiments are useful although we have to add some learning period for
agents to understand the working of the system. If it takes a rather long
time, then historical programming taking account of the initial conditions I
is more relevant than the analysis of stochastic equilibria. simj
Incidentally, I was talking about this paper with Dr Georges de Menu
on the plane, and his related point, which I should like to quote if he does prig
not mind, was that if we are examining the properties of long run
equilibrium, why do we need inertia like the short run Phillips curve? If
the asymptotic state is in question, does it not suffice to examine only a
new-classical model with a vertical long run Phillips curve?
My second comment concerns the use of simple rules. As a pedagogical
device it is fine, but I have an ambivalent feeling about the adoption of
very simple rules. In this world of rational expectations, agents know the
structure correctly and they know exactly what the government is doing.
The simpler the rule, the easier it is for private agents to learn about it.Interdependent macroeconomic policy 273
ved This is an attractive side of the analysis. On the other hand, I cannot help
med- feeling some uneasiness about the asymmetry in the degree of sophistication
;me assumed between private agents and governments. Private agents know
sble economic structures and government policies completely, and pick the
right saddle point paths in spite of various disturbances. Governments, on
)rice the other hand, can only choose the value of fi.Accordingto Professor
obal Morishima, in the UK the best students go after graduation to the
tive academic world as university or high school teachers, the next best go to
•wili public service, and the least good to the private business sector. In Japan,
the on the other hand, I feel that the best and brightest go to the public service,
vin next to private business, and perhaps the least bright to the academic
this world. Thus while this model may reflect some aspects of British society,
the strong asymmetry in the model does not seem to fit my conception of
lage, the real world.
the Third, on the simple rules. First of all, though simple minded the
ting government has perfect control of the nominal interest rate. Thus monetary
• shocks u2arecompletely offset. Imagine a world where a case of missing
nore money appears; can the government still just smooth the shock as assumed
here? A more basic question is why one has to choose the nominalinterest
-
. My rate. The well known criticism of Keynesian economics developed by the
e all monetarist school was that if one only aims at the nominal interest rate,
take one cannot distinguish whether a high level of the nominal rate reflects a
ium. high real rate of interest that has a depressionary effect, or a high rate of
rt inflationary expectations reflecting a boom. If you stick to the rule of trying
peed to keep nominal interest rates constant in an inflationary situation, you
f the may end up with severe inflation because the attempt may reduce the real
•hese rate. Thus it is no wonder that the price rule will do a better job. Here
i for again, even though control of the real rate of interest is hard, the
long government could be a little smarter.
•ions Finally, there is an interesting structure connecting the choice among
simple rules and the possible outcomes under any given rule. Here again
lénil temptation arises for the government to renege on the committed rule that
does private agents are counting on.
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